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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis exists on two levels. It" is an examination 
of certain topics in seventeenth century and eighteenth century 
philosophy, and at the same time an attempt to utilise the 
insights afforded by Heidegger and Foucault in the writing of 
the history of systems of thought. I have gone about the thesis 
in this way because I think there are theoretical inadequacies 
in most writings in the history of ideas. While I have not 
concerned myself to any great degree with an examination and 
critique of these inadequacies, I have used them as a starting 
point. In other words, my concern is not with these inadequacies 
as such. Ra·ther, the aim of this thesis is to examine the 
writing of the history of philosophy by attempting to write a 
tiny portion of its history. This thesis is therefore a 
process, a means bv which the act of writing becomes an exami-
nation of the possibility of writing the 'history of philosophy' 
itself. 
In the introduction to the first chapter and in the first 
section of that chapter, I have at·tempted to establish certain 
problems and conditions which provide a way into the writing 
of the history of philosophy. The way in is not pure accept-
ance of certain approaches. Rather, it is an examination of 
what constitutes an 'approach'. The criterion used to sub-
stantiate what accounts for an 'approach' is the relationship 
between the approach and metaphysics. llhat has been argued 
is that central to any approach, central to the act of writing, 
is that the approach to metaphysics cannot be trapped within 
metaphysics. Rather, writing must exist in a state of diff-
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erence from metaphysics. There can be no .'outside' of meta-
physics, as the opposition outside/inside is part of metaphysics 
itself. The consequence of this is that a non-metaphysical 
conception of difference must be established. Hence one of 
the main concerns of the first chapter is this activity. 
The first chapter is therefore an establishing of the 
means by which two paradigms of the knowing process will be 
examined. However, as is made clear in the first chapter, 
it is not the 'pure' part of a pure and applied study. Rather, 
what has been attempted are the pre--conditions of such a 
study, concentrating on an explanation of the way in which 
these paradigms can differ and the conception of 'text' which 
is at play in the establishing of a paradigm. I argue that a 
text is inseparable from its epistemic conditions of existence, 
i.e., the conditions which constitute knowledge in a given 
discursive practice, in terms of the rules governing the 
knowing process. The second section of the first chapter is 
an attempt to establish the epistemic conditions of existence 
which were at play in these centuries. However, if the text 
is inseparable from its conditions of existence, then the 
discussion of philosophical texts must take place in terms of 
their conditions of existence. It is for this reason too 
that the thesis does not divide into a nure section and an 
'" 
applied section. The establishing of the paradigms must take 
place in relation to these conditions of existence. This point 
is at play in chapters two and three, which are concerned with 
establishing the paradigms of demonstrable knowledge and the 
3 
Humean paradigm. What I attempt to show i~ that it is only 
in terms of a certain conception of identity and difference 
that the difference between these can be explained, and that 
it is only in terms of a certain conception of text that the 
paradigms can in fact be constructed. 
